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Prisoner's Dilemma and the Tower of Babel
Kristina Setzekorn
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Introduction
The modern business paradigm, like the Tower of Babel, is being transformed by
information technology-enabled communication capability, from one of competition to
one of cooperation. This is illustrated by Miller, Roth and Kim's (1992) report, in which
they compare and contrast the Boston University Manufacturing Futures Survey's results
from its inception in 1981 with those throughout the 1980's and the most recent in 1990.
The survey was administered to approximately 200 American manufacturing executives,
who in it ranked the importance of strategic manufacturing capabilities and the initiatives
their firms are undertaking. The authors' results thus give a cross-sectional view of
manufacturing priorities and initiatives, their evolution through the 1980's, and the
respondents' projections of such into the 1990's.
The authors report a shift in manufacturing response patterns from restructuring (i.e.,
downsizing, plant closure, plant relocation, workforce reductions, product
standardization) and process improvement and product improvement in the 1980's, to the
response pattern characterized by the authors as "integrative". This integrative pattern
includes initiatives such as :
1) constructing measures that are congruent with business strategy,
2) using interfunctional teams to span functional barriers,
3) sharing goals through the entire hierarchy,
4) training supervisors and workers, and
5) enhancing organizational learning through knowledge transfer.
I contend that this paradigm shift is partly due to the ubiquitous integration of
information technology (IT) into all facets of the business environment. The Tower of
Babel is an apt metaphor for the modern IT-enabled business paradigm shift, in that
communication capability enabled cooperation in the Tower's construction. The Tower's
destruction was due to lack of communication. Likewise, business effectiveness and
efficiency are enabled through cooperation, which depends on communication capability.
Economic Theory
Gurbaxni and Whang (1991) say, "Modern IT...has the potential to reduce market
transaction costs related to contracting, since it facilitates tighter interfirm links through

information sharing and mutual monitoring." Clemons and Row (1992) suggest that IT
has the effect of reducing not only the coordination cost component of transaction costs,
but also the transaction risk component, i.e., the risk associated with the opportunism of a
firm's trading partners, e.g., shirking, loss of resource control, ex post contract renegotiation. This is because IT provides the mechanism for improved monitoring of
contract performance, and serves as the firm's organizational memory.
Prisoner's Dilemma
I contend this decreased transaction risk has the effect of shifting a finite prisoner's
dilemma game to an infinite game. This device gets its name from the story: two
conspirators were arrested and interrogated separately by the police. Each was offered a
plea bargain: if he would implicate his co-conspirator (i.e., "fink"), and his co-conspirator
did not implicate him (i.e., "cooperate"), he would go free. If he refused to implicate his
co-conspirator("cooperate"), and his co-conspirator implicated him("fink"), he would
spend ten years in prison. If both conspirators refused to implicate the other
("cooperate"), they would each serve one year in prison, and if each implicated the other
("fink"), each would spend five years in prison. Therefore, the best strategy for each to
follow--the Nash equilibrium (neither has an incentive to unilaterally change his
strategy)--in a finite, i.e., one-shot game, is to "fink" on his partner (each will serve five
years in prison).
Fink
Cooperate

Fink
5, 5
10, 0

Cooperate
0, 10
1. 1

The infinite game version is one in which each business partner plans to continue doing
business with the other, and if this relationship should end, it will be a surprise to both,
and both will be worse off. Each, therefore is confident the other won't fink. Hence, in the
Nash equilibrium, both "cooperate" (each will spend one year in prison--as opposed to
five, in the finite game).
IT encourages an infinite horizon, in that it enables an organizational memory that
transcends individuals' tenures with individual firms. Firms' reputations are maintained in
the corporate memory. Thus, firms have an incentive to "cooperate", in that trading
partners will know their past behavior--i.e., do they "cooperate" or "fink"? IT also
enables mutual monitoring of performance. Therefore, shirking (i.e., "finking") can more
likely be punished, possibly using a "tit for tat" strategy in which a trading partner
"cooperates" until he catches his trading partner "finking", after which he "finks" until the
partner begins to "cooperate". A more draconian, although realistic, strategy is called
"grim", in which a partner "cooperates" until his partner "finks", at which point his
strategy becomes "fink forever". This would be analogical to doing business with a firm
until it is found to be cheating, at which time its trading partner ceases all business with
it--forever.
Cooperation

Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) discuss the intermediate formation of electronic
hierarchies, in which a smaller set of vendors is more closely tied to producers by
information technology. The fact that they depend upon one another more, and intend to
continue doing business with one another in the future, makes it reasonable for them to
invest in relation-specific assets and non-contractable services like quality, reduced cycle
time and innovation. This trend, combined with a trend toward increased outsourcing, has
been identified by Clemons and Row (1993) as the "Move to the Middle" hypothesis.
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) attribute this establishment of closer relationships with a
smaller set of suppliers to the improved profitability accruing from suppliers' investments
in "noncontractibles". Suppliers would normally be unwilling to invest in
"noncontractibles"--due to transaction risk that their customers will appropriate
advantage, without paying them for their additional investment. To signal their intention
not to fink, producers limit the set of suppliers, thus improving the suppliers' bargaining
positions with respect to profit allocation, and guaranteeing adequate return on suppliers'
investment. Fewer suppliers can thus bargain for a larger piece of a larger pie.
Applications
Clemons and Row (1993) use a different approach, when writing of limits to interfirm
cooperation. They portray the game as a finite prisoners' dilemma played by two
suppliers, each of whom will fink every time, which is to the retailer's advantage.
My point is that the supplier should be forming a strategic alliance with his customer, in
which they both win. In this infinite game, neither player has an incentive to unilaterally
fink, because he would be worse off. Rather than using Clemons and Row's (1993)
example of a retailer playing two soap manufacturers against one another, I would use the
example of a small soft drink bottler entering an alliance with a retailer, as described in
The Wall Street Journal (March 3, 1994). The manufacturer bottles the soft drink under
the retailer's brand, and passes along a larger margin to the retailer (in this case 20%, as
compared to Coke and Pepsi's maximum of 5%), who in turn provides preferential shelf
space, advertising, competitive information, and promotion assistance.
Each participant is better off in this arrangement than in any other. Participants would
have a continuing relationship, trust, partnership. They would be able to negotiate "noncontractibles" that arise. Pepsi and Coke, according to this article, were finding it difficult
to compete. This is similar to McKesson's Economost system in which McKesson allied
itself strategically with its independent pharmacy customers to improve its customers'
competitive positions--and thereby assure its own continued survival and growth.
(Johnston & Lawrence, 1988)
Several other examples are cropping up--Merck's acquisition of Medco, and Lilly's
acquisition of PCS will allow these companies to get closer to their customers. The infant
formula industry is beginning to advertise directly to new parents. Drug manufacturers
are also beginning to advertise directly to patients, telling customers, "Ask your doctor if
[our drug] can help you." These companies are increasingly integrating their value

chains, forming partnerships with their customers, in addition to relying on others in the
distribution channels.
Intra-firm Integration
This discussion has an intra-firm parallel, also, to which all five of Miller, et.al.'s
integrative initiatives are relevant. Rockart & Short say that "...IT's most important role is
allowing firms to manage organizational interdependence...to achieve concurrence of
effort along multiple dimensions of the organization."(1989:7)
This concept of organizational interdependence is included in Henderson's discussion of
strategic partnership, which he defines as, "...a working relationship that reflects a longterm commitment, a sense of mutual cooperation, shared risk and benefits, and other
qualities consistent with concepts and theories of participatory decision making."(1990:8)
This is relevant to the goal sharing and strategy-congruent measure construction
initiatives, in that an incentive system aligned with the partnership goal structure causes
the participants to view the partnership as an infinite game. This is because each of their
"payoffs" are maximized in the partnership, causing each to believe the relationship won't
be unilaterally ended--i.e., the partners won't "fink"." One executive's statement sums it
up: 'Why do I think it will last? Because we both have something to gain.'"(Henderson,
1990:17)
Henderson concludes with the point that partnerships are not always the most appropriate
relationships--that transaction-type relationships are sometimes preferable. Transaction
relationships could be construed as finite games, as opposed to the infinite game
partnerships. The important thing is to know the difference, as the strategies (and
payoffs!) are very different." All agreed that an inherently bad and surprisingly common
situation is to believe a partnership exists when, in fact, the relationship is a transaction."
(Henderson 1990:17) The prisoner's dilemma analogy is "cooperating" when one's
opponent is "finking".
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